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UNCERTAINTY IS THE ONLY CERTAINTY: A
FIVE-CATEGORY TEST TO CLARIFY THE UNSURE
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN CONTENT-BASED AND CONTENTNEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
Jay Alan Sekulow∗
Erik M. Zimmerman∗∗
ABSTRACT
The lines between content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based
restrictions on speech remain unclear in key respects despite the critical
importance that these characterizations hold within First Amendment
jurisprudence. This Article will analyze the law concerning the boundaries
between these categories of laws with respect to speech activities in public and
limited forums. The Article argues that the following five categories of laws
are inherently suspect under the Free Speech Clause and should be treated as
such:
1. The government’s actual purpose is to suppress speech based on its
content or viewpoint, or to impose subjective editorial control over content or
viewpoint.
2. The government interest that the law is intended to further relates to an
aspect of the direct or emotive communicative impact of regulated expression,
rather than the manner of its delivery.
3. The law, on its face, treats speakers differently due to the content or
viewpoint of their message, or excludes from its coverage speech or conduct
relating to different subject matters or viewpoints that pose similar threats to
the government’s asserted interests.
4. The actual or inevitable effect of the law is to prevent speakers
espousing certain messages from effectively reaching their intended audience,
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such as by targeting a particular location or manner of expression that is
closely tied to one subject matter or viewpoint.
5. The law lends itself to use for content- or viewpoint-discriminatory
purposes, or there is a realistic possibility that official suppression is afoot.
Formal recognition by the Court that laws of this nature should be subject
to strict scrutiny would bring much needed clarity to this area of law and
would help to ensure that freedom of speech receives the robust protection that
it deserves, while affording the government ample room to enact reasonable,
narrowly tailored laws that address legitimate concerns.
INTRODUCTION
Although the distinctions between content-neutral, content-based, and
viewpoint-based restrictions on speech remain a critically important aspect of
First Amendment doctrine, the lines between these three categories remain
quite unclear in key respects despite volumes of court decisions and scholarly
commentary on the subject.1 In many instances, opponents of a law that affects
the exercise of free speech can plausibly characterize it as content- or
viewpoint-based, relying upon certain Supreme Court decisions, while
supporters of the same law can plausibly characterize it as content- and
viewpoint-neutral, relying upon other aspects of those same decisions, different
decisions, or both.
For example, in various, and often conflicting, free speech decisions over
the past several decades, the Court has (1) declined to examine the
government’s motive, (2) held laws to be content-based despite the assertion of
a neutral government purpose, and (3) stated that the government’s purpose is

1 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality,
16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1270 (2014) (“The Court has regularly fallen into acrimonious disputes over the
question of whether a particular regulation is ‘content-based’ or ‘content-neutral,’ and which strand of analysis
should serve as the dividing line. A similar perplexity has afflicted the lower courts.” (footnote omitted));
Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of
Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353 (2006) (“[T]he vagaries inherent in characterizing speech
regulations as content-based versus content-neutral have resulted in standards for distinguishing between them
that are applied in an inconsistent and results-driven manner by the Court.”). Not everyone agrees that the
Court’s content-neutrality jurisprudence lacks sufficient clarity. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content
Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 232–33 (2012) (“[C]laims of incoherence [in content
discrimination doctrine] are greatly overstated. In fact, the case law largely reflects a coherent position—
though, to be fair to the critics, not a position the Court has clearly claimed for itself.”).
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the “principal inquiry.”2 Additionally, in some cases the law’s likely or
inevitable effect was considered to be important, while in others it was
essentially ignored. The resulting confusion and uncertainty ultimately
threatens the robust exercise of First Amendment rights by giving government
actors unduly broad leeway to burden that exercise.3
This Article will analyze the law concerning the boundaries between
content-based (including viewpoint-based) laws and content-neutral laws with
respect to speech activities in public and limited forums. The Supreme Court’s
decisions in McCullen v. Coakley4 and Reed v. Town of Gilbert5 provided a
degree of clarity on certain points, but they are also ample proof that the lines
of demarcation are not firmly established in many respects.
The Court’s shift toward emphasizing the government’s asserted motive for
enacting a law that restricts speech has, as Justice Brennan once feared, “set
the Court on a road that will lead to the evisceration of First Amendment
freedoms.”6 The considerable narrowing of the class of laws considered to be
content-based has also, by extension, narrowed the class of laws considered to
be viewpoint-discriminatory; in numerous cases discussed herein, the majority
held a law to be content-neutral, and therefore viewpoint-neutral, while
concurring or dissenting Justices argued that the law was both content- and
viewpoint-discriminatory.
This Article will suggest a formulation of the relevant test, drawn from
various majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions issued over the past
several decades, that would be appropriately protective of free speech while
leaving ample room for narrowly tailored government regulations. In
particular, this Article argues that the following five categories of laws are
inherently suspect under the Free Speech Clause and should be treated as such:
1. The government’s actual purpose is to suppress speech based on its
content or viewpoint, or to impose subjective editorial control over content or
viewpoint.
2 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–92 (1989); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
3 “Constitutional doctrine . . . . should allow citizens to know enough to invoke their rights successfully
without seeking adjudication in every case. . . . [and] should be easily understood by the officials charged with
administering it and should lead them fairly reliably to decisions that are consistent with constitutional
commitments to free expression.” Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1304.
4 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
5 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
6 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 338 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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2. The government interest that the law is intended to further relates to an
aspect of the direct or emotive communicative impact of regulated expression,
rather than the manner of its delivery.
3. The law, on its face, treats speakers differently due to the content or
viewpoint of their message, or excludes from its coverage speech or conduct
relating to different subject matter or viewpoints that pose similar threats to the
government’s asserted interests.
4. The actual or inevitable effect of the law is to prevent speakers
espousing certain messages from effectively reaching their intended audience,
such as by targeting a particular location or manner of expression that is
closely tied to one subject matter or viewpoint.
5. The law lends itself to use for content- or viewpoint-discriminatory
purposes, or there is a realistic possibility that official suppression is afoot.
As discussed herein, numerous Supreme Court opinions have explained
why these five categories of laws should be characterized as content-or
viewpoint-based, and subject to strict scrutiny. Formal recognition by the
Court that these five categories of laws should be subject to strict scrutiny
would bring much needed clarity to this area of law while affording the
government ample room to enact reasonable, narrowly tailored laws that
address legitimate concerns.
I. A REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT’S CONTENT- AND
VIEWPOINT-NEUTRALITY JURISPRUDENCE REVEALS MULTIPLE AREAS OF
DISAGREEMENT AND DISPUTE
While the Supreme Court has consistently held that content- and
viewpoint-based laws are highly suspect under the First Amendment, the
formulation of the test for determining whether a law is actually content- or
viewpoint-based has not been consistent. Rather, the most consistent aspect of
this area of law is the presence of sharp division among the Justices concerning
the nature and proper scope of the content- and viewpoint-neutrality tests. This
section will review many of the leading cases that address content- and
viewpoint-neutrality, detailing various aspects in which there is confusion or
division among the Justices and also highlighting instances in which the Court
failed to adequately protect the freedom of speech.
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A. Foundational Content-Neutrality Cases: O’Brien to Reed
Although nearly half a century elapsed between the Court’s decisions in
United States v. O’Brien7 and Reed v. Town of Gilbert,8 some key aspects of
the areas of law that they addressed remain unsettled or in dispute. Since Ward
v. Rock Against Racism9 has emerged as perhaps the most important case in
this area, this section will be divided into three parts: pre-Ward cases, Ward,
and post-Ward cases.
1. Content-Neutrality Cases Before Ward
The standards set forth in O’Brien for determining whether a law is
content-neutral are arguably more protective of free expression than the
language appearing in more recent cases. O’Brien burned his Selective Service
registration certificate as a means of symbolically expressing his anti-war
views.10 He was convicted under a law that prohibited the intentional
destruction of registration certificates.
The Court unanimously upheld the law on its face and as applied, holding
that it was a content-neutral regulation of conduct that only incidentally
impacted expression.11 The Court stated that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”12 The Court set forth the
following four-part test for the review of laws that only incidentally impact
free expression:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.13

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

391 U.S. 367 (1968).
135 S. Ct. 2218.
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
391 U.S. at 369–70.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
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The Court’s analysis focused primarily on the nature of the interest
furthered by the law and the law’s actual effects in practice, and the Court held
that “both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment
are limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct.”14
Concerning the interest furthered by the law, the Court held that preserving the
efficient functioning of the Selective Service system was unrelated to the
suppression of free speech.15 The Court distinguished the case at bar from “one
where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some
measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself
thought to be harmful.”16
Moreover, the Court concluded that, while “the inevitable effect of a statute
on its face may render it unconstitutional,”17 “there is nothing necessarily
expressive about” the knowing destruction of registration certificates.18 The
Court noted that the law “does not punish only destruction engaged in for the
purpose of expressing views. . . . [and] no more abridges free speech on its face
than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers’ licenses, or a
tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and records.”19 Elaborating on the
“inevitable effect” issue, Justice Harlan noted in his concurring opinion that
the Court’s analysis would “not foreclose consideration of First Amendment
claims in those rare instances when an ‘incidental’ restriction upon
expression, . . . in practice has the effect of entirely preventing a ‘speaker’
from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise
lawfully communicate.”20
Importantly, the Court expressly rejected the notion that a review of the
government’s subjective motive is necessary to determine whether a law is
content-neutral, stating that “under settled principles the purpose of
Congress . . . is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional.”21
Certainly, under O’Brien, evidence of the government’s motive may be
relevant in the consideration of whether the government’s stated interest during
litigation is contrived, or whether the interest “arises in some measure because
the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id. at 388–89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 383 (majority opinion).
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harmful,”22 but evidence of the government’s motive, standing alone, is neither
necessary nor sufficient to show that a law is content-based.
The Supreme Court has often considered the extent to which regulations of
specific locations are consistent with the Free Speech Clause where a speaker’s
target audience is closely connected to that location. In Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley,23 the Court held that an ordinance prohibiting picketing or
demonstrating within 150 feet of a school from a half hour before to a half
hour after school sessions, except for peaceful labor dispute picketing, was
unconstitutional.24 The speech at issue was an individual’s peaceful picket of a
school’s alleged racial discrimination; as such, requiring the speaker to move
to another location would have seriously diminished the speech’s intended
communicative impact.25
The Court’s analysis included both free speech and equal protection
principles, and it rested on the fact that the expressive activities allowed at the
location (peaceful labor picketing) affected the government’s asserted interest
(preventing disruption to school activities) to a similar extent as the activities
prohibited at the location (all non-labor picketing, regardless of whether it was
peaceful).26 Despite the government’s assertion of a neutral purpose, the Court
held the law to be content-based.27 The Court stated,
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content. . . .
. . . [G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to
express less favored or more controversial views. . . . Selective
exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone,
and may not be justified by reference to content alone.28

22

Id. at 382.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
24 Id. at 93–94.
25 Id. at 93.
26 Id. at 94–102.
27 Id. at 95–96.
28 Id. In Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), the Court held that a law that prohibited the picketing of
residences or dwellings, but included an exception for labor picketing at a place of employment, was
“constitutionally indistinguishable from the ordinance invalidated in Mosley.” Id. at 460. Three Justices
dissented on the grounds that the law was not content-based but rather distinguished between types of
residences: those utilized as businesses, for instance, were potentially subject to more picketing than those that
were not. Id. at 482 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The State has differentiated only when the residence has been
23
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The degree to which Mosley should continue to impact the
content-neutrality analysis depends upon one’s perspective. Mosley can be read
broadly to suggest that laws that limit certain expressive activities at a
particular location, while leaving untouched other expressive activities that
impact the government’s asserted interests in a similar manner, are likely
content-based. Or, Mosley can be read narrowly for the proposition that laws
that expressly differentiate, on their face, between categories of subject matter
are content-based.
The Court was sharply divided in Members of City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers for Vincent29 over the importance of purpose and the possibility
of discriminatory effects in the content-neutrality inquiry, a divide that
continues today. In Taxpayers for Vincent, the Court upheld a law prohibiting
the posting of signs on public property that included exemptions for plaques
that commemorated historical, cultural, or artistic events or locations, as well
as address numbers painted on street curbs.30 The Court held that the law was
content-neutral because “[t]he text of the ordinance is neutral—indeed it is
silent—concerning any speaker’s point of view,” and “there is not even a hint
of bias or censorship in the City’s enactment or enforcement of this
ordinance.”31 The Court also rejected the idea that the city could have provided
an exemption for political campaign signs, stating,
[E]ven though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible
measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other
communications that command the same respect. An assertion that
“Jesus Saves,” that “Abortion is Murder,” that every woman has the
“Right to Choose,” or that “Alcohol Kills,” may have a claim to a
constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as
“Roland Vincent—City Council.” To create an exception for
appellees’ political speech and not these other types of speech might
create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content
discrimination.32

Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, to
explain his view that “the Court’s lenient approach towards the restriction of

used as a place of business, a place for public meetings, or a place of employment, or is occupied by the picket
himself.”).
29 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
30 Id. at 817.
31 Id. at 804.
32 Id. at 815–16 (citation omitted).
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speech for reasons of aesthetics threatens seriously to undermine the
protections of the First Amendment.”33 He argued that
a reviewing court faces substantial difficulties determining whether
the actual objective is related to the suppression of speech. The
asserted interest in aesthetics may be only a facade for content-based
suppression. . . . [A] governmental interest in aesthetics cannot be
regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify a restriction of speech
based on an assertion that the content of the speech is, in itself,
aesthetically displeasing. Because aesthetic judgments are so
subjective, however, it is too easy for government to enact
restrictions on speech for just such illegitimate reasons and to evade
effective judicial review by asserting that the restriction is aimed at
some displeasing aspect of the speech that is not solely
communicative—for example, its sound, its appearance, or its
location. An objective standard for evaluating claimed aesthetic
judgments is therefore essential; for without one, courts have no
reliable means of assessing the genuineness of such claims.34

Justice Brennan added, “The fact that a ban on temporary signs applies to
all signs does not necessarily imply content-neutrality. Because particular
media are often used disproportionately for certain types of messages, a
restriction that is content-neutral on its face may, in fact, be content-hostile.”35
In other words, a disproportionate or discriminatory impact may indicate that a
law is content-based.
In an apparent departure from O’Brien, the Court elevated the
government’s purpose to the forefront of content-neutrality analysis in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.36 In Renton, the Court held that a zoning
ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of a
residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school
was a valid, content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.37
33

Id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 822–23 (citation omitted).
35 Id. at 823 n.5. A similar divide occurred in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984), in which the Court held that a regulation prohibiting camping in certain national parks, which had
the effect of preventing demonstrators from sleeping in a park as a means of drawing attention to
homelessness, was content-neutral because it was “not being applied because of disagreement with the
message presented.” Id. at 295. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justice Brennan, to argue that the Court’s
content-neutrality analysis provided insufficient protection for the freedom of speech, as content-neutral laws
may have a stifling effect on the ability to speak effectively, and tend to have a disproportionate impact on
certain groups or viewpoints. Id. at 313–16, 313 n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
37 Id. at 46, 48, 54–55.
34
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The Court stated that, although “regulations enacted for the purpose of
restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First
Amendment,”38 “the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films
shown at ‘adult motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of
such theaters on the surrounding community.”39 Therefore, the law was
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”40 The
Court rejected the view that “if ‘a motivating factor’ in enacting the ordinance
was to restrict respondents’ exercise of First Amendment rights the ordinance
would be invalid.”41 Rather, “[t]he District Court’s finding as to ‘predominate’
intent . . . is more than adequate to establish that the city’s pursuit of its zoning
interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”42
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall. He argued that the
law was content-based on its face, as it “selectively imposes limitations on the
location of a movie theater based exclusively on the content of the films shown
there.”43 He added:
Other motion picture theaters, and other forms of “adult
entertainment” . . . are not subject to the same restrictions. This
selective treatment strongly suggests that Renton was interested not
in controlling the “secondary effects” associated with adult
businesses, but in discriminating against adult theaters based on the
content of the films they exhibit. . . .
. . . The ordinance’s underinclusiveness is cogent evidence that it
was aimed at the content of the films shown in adult movie theaters.44

The dissent also criticized the Court for its heavy reliance on the city’s
assertion of a neutral purpose, noting that
38

Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 47.
40 Id. at 48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
41 Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.3d 527, 537 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
42 Id. at 48.
43 Id. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As one article has argued, “content neutrality means (or should
mean) . . . that the applicability of the law has absolutely nothing to do with the nature of the proscribed
speech.” Marc Rohr, De Minimis Content Discrimination: The Vexing Matter of Sign-Ordinance Exemptions,
7 ELON L. REV. 327, 338 (2015) (emphasis omitted). In practice, however, that has not always been the case.
See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 1, at 1352 (“[T]he vast majority of speech regulations reviewed by the Court
make content distinctions on their face, and . . . the Court has taken quite often to designating them as contentneutral . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
44 City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 57–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
39
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the circumstances here strongly suggest that the ordinance was
designed to suppress expression . . . . Only [a broader view of what
makes a law content-based] can insure that cities will not use their
zoning powers as a pretext for suppressing constitutionally protected
expression.45

The dissent also argued that the law was viewpoint-discriminatory:
As a practical matter, the speech suppressed by restrictions such as
those involved [here] will almost invariably carry an implicit, if not
explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sexual mores. Such
restrictions, in other words, have a potent viewpoint-differential
impact. . . . To treat such restrictions as viewpoint-neutral seems
simply to ignore reality.46

The extent to which Renton’s analysis should be extended outside the
context of the regulation of adult businesses was debated in Boos v. Barry.47 In
Boos, the Court considered a Washington, D.C. law that banned both the
display of signs that tend to bring a foreign government into public odium or
disrepute within 500 feet of that government’s foreign embassies or consulates
(the display clause) as well as any congregation of three or more persons
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy or consulate (the congregation clause).48
The Court held that the display clause was content-based, but upheld the
congregation clause.49 In a portion of the lead opinion joined by only three
Justices, Justice O’Connor stated that the display clause was content-based
because “[o]ne category of speech has been completely prohibited within 500
feet of embassies. Other categories of speech . . . are permitted.”50 The opinion
also distinguished Renton, stating,
We spoke in that decision only of secondary effects of speech,
referring to regulations that apply to a particular category of speech
because the regulatory targets happen to be associated with that type
of speech. So long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to
do with content, . . . we concluded that the regulation was properly
analyzed as content neutral.

45

Id. at 62.
Id. at 56 n.1 (alterations in original) (quoting Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 111–12 (1978)).
47 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
48 Id. at 315–18.
49 Id. at 318–21, 329–34.
50 Id. at 319.
46
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Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its
audience present a different situation. Listeners’ reactions to speech
are not the type of “secondary effects” we referred to in Renton. . . .
. . . Because the display clause regulates speech due to its
potential primary impact, we conclude it must be considered contentbased.51

Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, to
reiterate his disagreement with Renton and also “to object to Justice
O’Connor’s assumption that the Renton analysis applies not only outside the
context of businesses purveying sexually explicit materials but even to political
speech.”52 Justice Brennan stated,
[S]econdary effects offer countless excuses for content-based
suppression of political speech. No doubt a plausible argument could
be made that the political gatherings of some parties are more likely
than others to attract large crowds causing congestion, that picketing
for certain causes is more likely than other picketing to cause visual
clutter, or that speakers delivering a particular message are more
likely than others to attract an unruly audience. Our traditional
analysis rejects such a priori categorical judgments based on the
content of speech . . . . The Renton analysis, however, creates a
possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can
concoct “secondary” rationalizations for regulating the content of
political speech. . . .
....
. . . [A] content-based law . . . intended to aim at the “secondary
effects” of certain types of speech . . . would still offend fundamental
free speech interests by denying speakers the equal right to engage in
speech and by denying listeners the right to an undistorted debate. . . .
. . . [T]oday’s application of the Renton analysis to political
speech . . . . could set the Court on a road that will lead to the
evisceration of First Amendment freedoms.53

51

Id. at 320–21.
Id. at 334–35 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
53 Id. at 335–38. One article has noted that “the secondary effects doctrine . . . has had a powerful
distorting effect on the traditional content-neutrality analysis that lies at the heart of much of the Court’s free
speech analysis. These changes to the traditional neutrality test have created precisely the First Amendment
problems feared by Renton’s early critics.” Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary Effects
Analysis and the Quiet Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 1190 (2013).
52
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2. Ward v. Rock Against Racism
The Court further cemented the primacy of purpose in the
content-neutrality test in Ward, which heavily impacted subsequent
content-neutrality jurisprudence.54 In Ward, the Court upheld rules governing
the use of a public bandshell in New York City’s Central Park.55 Performers
were required to use sound amplification equipment and a sound technician
provided by the city due to concerns raised over sound technician inexperience
and volume control at previous events held at the bandshell.56 The city sound
technician’s practice was to allow the musicians to maintain autonomy over the
sound mix.57 Organizers of an annual event argued that the rules were
content-based because sound volume and mix have some expressive elements
to them.58
The Court was split 6-to-3 over the proper analysis to determine whether
the law was content-neutral, the scope of the narrow-tailoring aspect of the test
for content-neutral laws, and whether the law was ultimately constitutional.59
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, stated that
[t]he principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality, in speech
cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because
of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government’s
purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
not others. Government regulation of expressive activity is
content-neutral so long as it is “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech.”60

The majority held that the law was content-neutral because its purpose was
to prevent excessively high volume levels, which is a goal “unrelated to the
content of expression.”61 On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that
“[a]ny governmental attempt to serve purely esthetic goals by imposing
54

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Id. at 784, 803.
56 Id. at 801.
57 Id. at 788.
58 Id. at 792–93.
59 Id. at 791–803.
60 Id. at 791–92 (citations omitted) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)).
61 Id.
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subjective standards of acceptable sound mix on performers would raise
serious First Amendment concerns.”62
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens. The
emphasis of the dissent’s content-neutrality analysis was more in line with that
of O’Brien: “[t]he Guidelines indisputably are content-neutral, as they apply to
all bandshell users irrespective of the message of their music. . . . They also
serve government’s significant interest in limiting loud noise in public
places.”63 The dissent also stated that
the majority’s reliance on Renton . . . is unnecessary and unwise. . . .
Today, for the first time, a majority of the Court applies Renton
analysis to a category of speech far afield from that decision’s
original limited focus. Given the serious threat to free expression
posed by Renton analysis, . . . I fear that its broad application may
encourage widespread official censorship.64

The extent to which Ward altered the content-neutrality test is a matter of
ongoing debate. On the one hand, Ward elevated the government’s purpose to
the “principal inquiry”; this is one of the main reasons why three Justices
dissented. It is not difficult, however, to come up with a plausible
content-neutral justification for virtually any law. For instance, as one article
notes, “A law that bans all civil rights marches would of course protect some
purposes unrelated to the content of expression, as it would reduce litter and
traffic congestion. But the law would still be obviously content based and
should be treated as such.”65 Additionally, whereas O’Brien implied that the
inevitable impact of a regulation could, in some cases, render it content-based,
Ward seems to minimize the relevance of that inquiry.
On the other hand, three of the Justices who joined the Ward majority
opinion—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia—joined an
opinion three years later in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul66 that asserted that “the
O’Brien test differs little from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions.”67 This would be an odd statement to make if Ward was intended
62

Id. at 793.
Id. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 804 n.1.
65 Rienzi & Buck, supra note 53, at 1213, 1234; see also McDonald, supra note 1, at 1376 (“By
importing [Renton’s emphasis on purpose] without an explicit secondary effects qualifier, the Court threw the
door wide open to content-neutral defenses for selective content restrictions.”).
66 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
67 Id. at 386 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)).
63
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to drastically alter the analysis that had been set forth in O’Brien, and it would
be quite bizarre if the standard applicable to laws that incidentally impact
speech was more protective of expression than the standard for laws that
directly regulate speech. Moreover, as discussed later, Justices Kennedy and
Scalia repeatedly expressed their view in subsequent cases that purpose should
not always be the predominant consideration, at least where a law draws
content-related distinctions on its face or has the inevitable impact of
handicapping one side of a debate.
3. Content-Neutrality Cases After Ward
The Court was again sharply divided when it decided R.A.V. In R.A.V., the
Court unanimously held that an ordinance that prohibited the use of objects or
symbols “which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender” was unconstitutional,68 but the Court split 5-to-4 on the rationale.
The Court stated that “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that all of the expression
reached by the ordinance is proscribable under the ‘fighting words’
doctrine, . . . the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses.”69 The majority stated that fighting words “can, consistently with
the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally
proscribable content,”70 but they cannot “be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”71
The Court emphasized that the rationale for the content-neutrality principle
is that “content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”72
Conversely, a law is likely not content-based where “there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”73 The Court reiterated
that “[l]isteners’ reactions to speech” and “[t]he emotive impact of speech on
its audience” are not “secondary effects” under Renton,74 and the Court also
rejected “the revolutionary proposition that the suppression of particular ideas
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 380, 396.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 383–84.
Id. at 387 (quoting, inter alia, Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991)).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 394.

SEKULOW_ZIMMERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

470

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

1/14/2016 2:28 PM

[Vol. 65:455

can be [considered to be a content-neutral regulation] when only those ideas
have been a source of trouble in the past.”75 Rather, Renton referred to a
regulation of speech that “happens to be associated with particular ‘secondary
effects’ of the speech, so that the regulation is ‘justified without reference to
the content of the . . . speech.’”76
Furthermore, the Court held that the law was viewpoint discriminatory, as
[o]ne could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all “anti-Catholic
bigots” are misbegotten; but not that all “papists” are, for that would
insult and provoke violence “on the basis of religion.” St. Paul has no
such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury rules.77

Justice White concurred to argue that “[a] prohibition on fighting words is
not a time, place, or manner restriction; it is a ban on [an unprotected] class of
speech that conveys an overriding message of personal injury and imminent
violence.”78 He also suggested that hypothetical laws that draw distinctions
between subsets of unprotected speech on an improper basis (such as the
speaker’s political affiliation) would violate the Equal Protection Clause, not
the First Amendment.79 Justice Stevens also concurred, stating,
Conduct that creates special risks or causes special harms may be
prohibited by special rules. Lighting a fire near an ammunition dump
or a gasoline storage tank is especially dangerous; such behavior may
be punished more severely than burning trash in a vacant lot.
Threatening someone because of her race or religious beliefs may
cause particularly severe trauma or touch off a riot, and threatening a
high public official may cause substantial social disruption; such
threats may be punished more severely than threats against someone
based on, say, his support of a particular athletic team. There are
legitimate, reasonable, and neutral justifications for such special
rules.80

R.A.V. highlighted division on the Court over the proper characterization of
government attempts to directly regulate speech that the government deems to
be especially harmful. The majority viewed the harm targeted by the
75

Id. at 396 n.8.
Id. at 389 (ellipsis in original) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986)).
77 Id. at 391–92.
78 Id. at 408 (White, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 406–07.
80 Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76
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government as a communicative aspect of the speech, thus making it a
content-based law, whereas the concurring Justices viewed the harm as
non-communicative in nature.
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC81 also generated significant
division among the Justices. In Turner Broadcasting, the Court held that
provisions of a federal law that required cable television systems to make some
of their channels available for local broadcast stations were content-neutral.82
The Court discussed the line between content-based and content-neutral laws
in detail:
Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, . . . .
pose[s] the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a
legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or
information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather
than persuasion. . . .
. . . Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content. . . . In contrast,
regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to
an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they pose a
less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the
public dialogue.
Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or
content neutral is not always a simple task. . . . [W]hile a contentbased purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that
a regulation is content-based, it is not necessary to such a showing in
all cases. Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be
enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on
content. . . .
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content-based. By contrast, laws that confer benefits or
impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views
expressed are in most instances content-neutral.
....

81
82

512 U.S. 622 (1994).
Id. at 661–62.
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. . . Our cases have recognized that even a regulation neutral on its
face may be content-based if its manifest purpose is to regulate
speech because of the message it conveys.83

Justice O’Connor wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justices Scalia,
Ginsburg, and, in part, Thomas, which argued that the law was content-based:
Preferences for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for
educational programming, and for news and public affairs all make
reference to content. They may not reflect hostility to particular
points of view, or a desire to suppress certain subjects because they
are controversial or offensive. They may be quite benignly motivated.
But benign motivation, we have consistently held, is not enough to
avoid the need for strict scrutiny of content-based justifications. The
First Amendment does more than just bar government from
intentionally suppressing speech of which it disapproves. It also
generally prohibits the government from excepting certain kinds of
speech from regulation because it thinks the speech is especially
valuable. . . .
....
It may well be that Congress also had other, content-neutral,
purposes in mind when enacting the statute. But we have never held
that the presence of a permissible justification lessens the impropriety
of relying in part on an impermissible justification. In fact, we have
often struck down statutes as being impermissibly content based even
though their primary purpose was indubitably content neutral. . . .
[W]hen a content-based justification appears on the statute’s face, we
cannot ignore it because another, content-neutral justification is
present.84

The Court was once again divided in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,
Inc.85 In Madsen, the Court considered an injunction that prohibited
demonstrating in certain ways and locations outside of an abortion clinic. It
included, among other things, a 36-foot buffer zone and a 300-foot ban on
approaching any person who had not indicated a desire to communicate.86
Evidence indicated that the sole factor determining whether unnamed
individuals would be deemed to be “acting in concert or participation” with the

83
84
85
86

Id. at 641–45 (citations omitted).
Id. at 677–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
512 U.S. 753 (1994).
Id. at 758–61.
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individuals named in the injunction was whether they expressed opposition to
abortion.87
The Court stated that the government’s purpose was the “threshold
consideration” and the “principal inquiry” for purposes of determining
content-neutrality.88 The Court concluded that the purpose of addressing
violations of a previous court order was neutral, adding that “the fact that the
injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the
injunction content or viewpoint based.”89 The Court also asserted that “targeted
picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but the
physical, wellbeing of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance,”90
and added that “[t]he First Amendment does not demand that patients at a
medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of
political protests.”91 The Court ultimately upheld part and invalidated part of
the injunction under a new standard that was less rigorous than strict scrutiny.92
Justice Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that
[t]he danger of content-based statutory restrictions upon speech is
that they may be designed and used precisely to suppress the ideas in
question, rather than to achieve any other proper governmental aim.
But that same danger exists with injunctions. . . . The injunction was
sought against a single-issue advocacy group by persons and
organizations with a business or social interest in suppressing that
group’s point of view. . . .
....
. . . [T]he Court errs in thinking that the vice of content-based
statutes is that they necessarily have the invidious purpose of
suppressing particular ideas. . . . The vice of content-based
legislation . . . is not that it is always used for invidious,
thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those
purposes. . . .

87

Id. at 795–97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 763 (majority opinion).
89 Id. at 763–64.
90 Id. at 768.
91 Id. at 772–73.
92 Id. at 763–76. In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997), the Court
applied Madsen in holding that an injunction that banned demonstrations within fifteen feet of an entrance or
driveway of an abortion clinic, or any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving a clinic, was
content-neutral. Id. at 374, 384–85. The Court upheld the fixed buffer zone but invalidated the floating buffer
zone. Id. at 380–81.
88
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. . . [T]he injunction in the present case was content-based
(indeed, viewpoint-based) to boot. . . . All those who wish to express
the same views as the named defendants are deemed to be “acting in
concert or participation” [with them and are thereby restricted by the
injunction]. . . .
....
. . . The pro-abortion demonstrators who were often making . . .
more noise than the petitioners, can continue to shout their chants at
their opponents exiled across the street to their hearts’ content.93

In Hill v. Colorado,94 the Court revisited these issues again and was deeply
divided. The Court upheld a law that made it unlawful for a person to
“‘knowingly approach’ within eight feet of another person,” within 100 feet of
the entrance to a health care facility, “without that person’s consent, ‘for the
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person.’”95 The impetus
for the law was the activities of abortion opponents outside of abortion clinics,
although the law could potentially be applied to other speakers and subjects.96
The Court held that the law was a regulation of the location and manner of
expression, not subject matter or viewpoint.97 The Court concluded that the
law’s purpose was to protect, at one particular type of location, “‘the right to
be free’ from persistent ‘importunity, following and dogging’ after an offer to
communicate has been declined,”98 and to “protect those who seek medical
treatment from the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an
unwelcome individual delivers a message . . . by physically approaching an
individual at close range.”99
The Court asserted that the fact that statements may need to be examined to
determine whether they constitute “oral protest, education, or counseling” did
not render the law content-based.100 Justice Souter concurred to state that
“[t]here is always a correlation with subject and viewpoint when the law
regulates conduct that has become the signature of one side of a controversy.
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

512 U.S. at 792–95, 810 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
530 U.S. 703 (2000).
Id. at 707, 735.
Id. at 709–10, 724–25.
Id. at 719–25.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 718 n.25.
Id. at 720–23.
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But that does not mean that every regulation of such distinctive behavior is
content based.”101
Justice Scalia dissented to explain his view that the law was content-based:
Whether a speaker must obtain permission before approaching within
eight feet . . . depends entirely on what he intends to say when he gets
there. I have no doubt that this regulation would be deemed
content-based in an instant if the case before us involved antiwar
protesters, or union members seeking to “educate” the public about
the reasons for their strike. . . .
....
. . . There comes a point . . . at which the regulation of action
intimately and unavoidably connected with traditional speech is a
regulation of speech itself. The strictures of the First Amendment
cannot be avoided by regulating the act of moving one’s lips; and
they cannot be avoided by regulating the act of extending one’s arm
to deliver a handbill, or peacefully approaching in order to speak. . . .
....
. . . The Court makes too much of the [principal inquiry] statement
in Ward . . . That is indeed “the principal inquiry”—suppression of
uncongenial ideas is the worst offense against the First
Amendment—but it is not the only inquiry. Even a law that has as its
purpose something unrelated to the suppression of particular content
cannot irrationally single out that content for its prohibition. . . .
....
In sum, it blinks reality to regard this statute . . . as anything other
than a content-based restriction upon speech in the public forum.102

Justice Kennedy—the author of the Ward decision—also dissented. He
stated,
The law imposes content-based restrictions on speech by reason of
the terms it uses, the categories it employs, and the conditions for its
enforcement. It is content based, too, by its predictable and intended
operation. Whether particular messages violate the statute is
determined by their substance. . . .
....
101
102

Id. at 737 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 742, 745–46, 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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. . . [A] statute of broad application is not content neutral if its
terms control the substance of a speaker’s message. If oral protest,
education, or counseling on every subject within an 8-foot zone
present a danger to the public, the statute should apply to every
building entrance in the State. . . . We would close our eyes to reality
were we to deny that “oral protest, education, or counseling” outside
the entrances to medical facilities concern a narrow range of topics—
indeed, one topic in particular. By confining the law’s application to
the specific locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State
has made a content-based determination.103

Justice Kennedy also explained his view that the law was viewpoint
discriminatory:
Viewpoint-based rules are invidious speech restrictions, yet the Court
approves this one. The purpose and design of the statute—as
everyone ought to know and as its own defenders urge in attempted
justification—are to restrict speakers on one side of the debate: those
who protest abortions. . . . The legislature’s purpose to restrict
unpopular speech should be beyond dispute.
The statute’s operation reflects its objective.104

The Court was once again sharply divided concerning the scope and
applicability of the content-neutrality test in McCullen v. Coakley.105 In
McCullen, the Court considered a free speech challenge to a law that made it
illegal to knowingly stand on a sidewalk or other public way within thirty-five
feet of an entrance or driveway to an abortion clinic.106 Several classes of
individuals were exempted from the law, including clinic employees or agents
acting within the scope of their employment.107
While the Court unanimously held that the law violated the First
Amendment, the Justices were split 5-to-4 on the issue of whether the law was
content-neutral. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts,
concluded that the law was content-neutral, but it was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored.108 The Court concluded that the law drew no content-based
103

Id. at 766–67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 768–69; see also McDonald, supra note 1, at 1407–08 (calling Hill “the poster child . . . for a
deeply flawed free speech doctrine”); Rohr, supra note 43, at 348 (“Hill was wrongly decided . . . [and] has
left the law of content discrimination in an unclear and unpredictable state.”).
105 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
106 Id. at 2525.
107 Id. at 2526.
108 Id. at 2529–41.
104
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distinctions on its face, nor did it require government authorities to examine
the content of expression to determine if a violation had occurred.109 Moreover,
the purposes served by the law—such as relieving congestion and promoting
safety—were unrelated to any discriminatory motive.110
The Court emphasized that “the Act would not be content neutral if it were
concerned with undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech
on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’”111 The Court also
concluded that there was a lack of evidence showing that, in practice, the
employee exemption was utilized to allow clinic escorts to discuss abortion
inside the regulated areas; otherwise, the exemption “would then facilitate
speech on only one side of the abortion debate—a clear form of viewpoint
discrimination that would support an as-applied challenge to the buffer zone at
that clinic.”112
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion that argued that the law was
content- and viewpoint-discriminatory. The existence of various other means
to protect the government’s interests, coupled with the fact that the law only
applied at abortion clinics, was problematic: “It blinks reality to say, as the
majority does, that a blanket prohibition on the use of streets and sidewalks
where speech on only one politically controversial topic is likely to occur—and
where that speech can most effectively be communicated—is not content
based.”113 Moreover, concerning the exemption for clinic employees and
agents, Justice Scalia stated that “a statute that forbids one side but not the
other to convey its message does not become viewpoint neutral simply because
the favored side chooses voluntarily to abstain from activity that the statute
permits.”114 Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion, stating that
“[s]peech in favor of the clinic and its work by employees and agents is
permitted; speech criticizing the clinic and its work is a crime. This is blatant
viewpoint discrimination.”115
McCullen’s holding that the law at issue was content-neutral is incorrect
and highlights the need for broader protection of the freedom of speech. As

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 2531–34.
Id. at 2531.
Id. at 2531–32 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
Id. at 2532–34.
Id. at 2543 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2547.
Id. at 2549 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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one article that was generally supportive of laws like the one at issue in
McCullen acknowledged,
Justice Scalia’s incredulity in the face of the majority’s finding
that the Act was content neutral reflects a commonsense intuition:
when a law disproportionately—or indeed exclusively—burdens
speech on a single topic, that law is in an important sense “based” on
that topic. Abortion clinic buffer zones place specific and targeted
burdens on antiabortion speech like that of Eleanor McCullen and her
coplaintiffs. Such laws should be subject to the highest scrutiny. . . .
....
. . . [A]s Justice Scalia recognized, laws that carry such
disproportionate burdens because they are limited to a specific
location carry a high risk of concealing improper motives. . . . [E]ven
Justice Kagan—a member of the McCullen majority—previously
argued that “a facially general law that operates to restrict only
speech of a particular kind ought to confront the strictest review.”
Laws like the Act that limit speech at specific, politically salient
locations are particularly likely to impose this sort of disparate
burden. When a facially neutral restriction foreseeably places a
substantial burden on speech concerning a single topic, the Court
should acknowledge that this restriction is content based and subject
it to strict scrutiny.116

The Court rejected a common misinterpretation of Ward in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert,117 although the Court was split on the broader question of whether
strict scrutiny ought to be applied where a law is facially content-based for
purportedly benign reasons. In Reed, a town’s comprehensive code governing
outdoor signs created various classifications of signs based on the information
that they conveyed, and treated signs in different classifications differently.118
For instance, signs considered to be “Ideological” or “Political” signs were
treated more favorably in terms of their permissible size and duration than
“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event.”119 The latter
category encompassed temporary signs posted each weekend by a church
whose Sunday services were held at various locations, and the church received
multiple citations for failing to comply with the outdoor sign code.120
116

The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Leading Case—McCullen v. Coakley, 128 HARV. L. REV. 221, 225,
227–28 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
117 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
118 Id. at 2224.
119 Id. at 2224–25.
120 Id. at 2225.
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After the church brought suit, the Ninth Circuit held that the sign code was
content-neutral because the town did not adopt it due to disagreement with any
particular message, and the code served interests unrelated to the content of
speech, and the Court ultimately held that the code was constitutional.121 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the law was content-based and could not
withstand strict scrutiny.122
Six Justices joined the majority opinion, which stated that there are two
general categories of content-based laws: (1) “a regulation of speech [that] ‘on
its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys” (i.e., “a
law [that] applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea
or message expressed”);123 and (2) “laws that cannot be ‘justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ or that were adopted by the
government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech]
conveys.’”124
The Court explained that the Ninth Circuit erred by treating the
government’s purpose as the controlling consideration, thereby improperly
skipping the first step in the analysis: determining whether the law was
content-based on its face.125 As the Court noted, “A law that is content based
on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign
motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas
contained’ in the regulated speech,” and “an innocuous justification cannot
transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.”126
The Court stated that because “[t]he restrictions in the Sign Code that apply
to any given sign . . . depend entirely on the communicative content of the
sign. . . . [w]e thus have no need to consider the government’s justifications or
purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is subject to strict
scrutiny.”127 The Court distinguished Ward by noting that the case involved a

121

Id. at 2226 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1071–76 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Id. at 2224.
123 Id. at 2227.
124 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
125 Id. at 2228.
126 Id. (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
127 Id. at 2227. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Court
held that a ban on the posting of on-site “For Sale” signs—enacted in an effort to minimize the perceived flight
of white homeowners from an integrated community—was an unconstitutional restriction of commercial
speech. Id. at 97–98. While the township argued that the law should be viewed as a regulation of the location
(front lawns) or manner (signs) of speech, the Court concluded that the township “proscribed particular types
122
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facially content-neutral regulation, in which case analysis of the government’s
purpose becomes the key consideration, but Ward does not stand for the
proposition that facially content-based laws are actually content-neutral where
the government’s purpose is benign.128 The Court added,
Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented
by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials
may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That
is why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of the
laws—i.e., the “abridg[ement] of speech”—rather than merely the
motives of those who enacted them. “The vice of content-based
legislation . . . is not that it is always used for invidious,
thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those
purposes.”129

Furthermore, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred by concluding that
the sign code was content-neutral because it was viewpoint-neutral.130 As the
Court explained,
This analysis conflates two distinct but related limitations that the
First Amendment places on government regulation of speech.
Government discrimination among viewpoints—or the regulation of
speech based on “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker”—is a “more blatant” and “egregious form
of content discrimination.” But it is well established that “[t]he First
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only
to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic.” . . .
Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is
content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints
within that subject matter.131

Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by Justices
Kennedy and Sotomayor, all of whom had also joined the majority opinion.
The opinion stated that content-based laws “present, albeit sometimes in a
subtler form, the same dangers as laws that regulate speech based on
of signs based on their content because it fears their ‘primary’ effect—that they will cause those receiving the
information to act upon it.” Id. at 93–94.
128 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228–29.
129 Id. at 2229 (citation omitted) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
130 Id. at 2229–30.
131 Id. (citations omitted). The Court also rejected the notion that a law that draws distinctions based on
who is speaking, or whether an event is occurring, is necessarily content-neutral. Id. at 2230–31.
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viewpoint. Limiting speech based on its ‘topic’ or ‘subject’ favors those who
do not want to disturb the status quo. Such regulations may interfere with
democratic self-government and the search for truth.”132
Justice Kagan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, expressing alarm over the possibility that countless seemingly benign
sign regulations throughout the country will be invalidated under the
majority’s reasoning: “[W]e may do well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely
reasonable’ laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive. . . . We can
administer our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense, so as
to leave standing laws that in no way implicate its intended function.”133
Justice Kagan argued that applying strict scrutiny is warranted when, unlike
in the case at hand, “there is any ‘realistic possibility that official suppression
of ideas is afoot,’” or when the government might effectively skew the
marketplace of ideas by hampering the expression of certain viewpoints.134 In
Justice Kagan’s view, the law at issue would not “pass strict scrutiny, or
intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test,”135 so the Court did not need to
reach the issue of whether strict scrutiny was warranted.136
Justice Breyer also wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that “the
category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts,
including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’
trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.”137 Justice Breyer
explained,
I would use content discrimination as a supplement to a more basic
analysis, which, tracking most of our First Amendment cases, asks
whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment
interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory
objectives. Answering this question requires examining the
seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of the
countervailing objectives, the extent to which the law will achieve

132

Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
134 Id. at 2237–38 (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)).
135 Id. at 2239.
136 Id. Justice Kagan relied upon City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), in which the Court
invalidated a sign regulation without determining the applicable level of scrutiny because the law would have
been unconstitutional under any First Amendment standard. Id. at 53.
137 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
133
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those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of
doing so.138

The various majority and separate opinions in the foregoing cases provide
some points of clarity concerning the determination of whether a law is
content- or viewpoint-based, but they also provide plenty of conflicting views
on key issues. Part II of this Article suggests how this area of law can be
clarified in a way that is appropriately protective of free speech and also
provides government actors with clarity when they consider possible
regulatory options.
B. A Review of Other Content- and Viewpoint-Neutrality Cases of Note
There are countless other Supreme Court cases addressing content- and
viewpoint-neutrality over the past several decades, but several of them are
worth discussing further because they either illustrate particular points of
agreement among most of the Justices or they are representative of key points
of disagreement that affect important doctrinal issues.
Regan v. Time, Inc.139 stands for the proposition that laws that provide
exemptions based on the content of expression are content-based even if they
are enacted for benign reasons. In Regan, the Court considered a federal
statutory provision that generally prohibited the photographic reproduction of
currency but made an exception for reproductions for “philatelic, numismatic,
educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes.”140 The Court stated,
A determination concerning the newsworthiness or educational value
of a photograph cannot help but be based on the content of the
photograph and the message it delivers. Under the statute, one
photographic reproduction will be allowed and another disallowed
solely because the Government determines that the message being
conveyed in the one is newsworthy or educational while the message
imparted by the other is not. The permissibility of the photograph is
therefore often “dependent solely on the nature of the message being
conveyed.” Regulations which permit the Government to
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment.141

138

Id. at 2235–36.
468 U.S. 641 (1984).
140 Id. at 644–46.
141 Id. at 648–49 (citation omitted) (quoting Carey v. Brown 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). The Court was
divided on other aspects of the case.
139
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The Court’s decision in United States v. Eichman142 is in accord with
Regan, although four Justices dissented to express an opposing view. In
Eichman, the Court held that a federal law making it a crime to knowingly
mutilate, deface, physically defile, burn, or trample upon an American flag was
content-based and unconstitutional.143 The Court explained,
Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit contentbased limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless
clear that the Government’s asserted interest is “related ‘to the
suppression of free expression,’” and concerned with the content of
such expression. . . . [T]he Government’s desire to preserve the flag
as a symbol for certain national ideals is implicated “only when a
person’s treatment of the flag communicates [a] message” to others
that is inconsistent with those ideals. . . .
....
. . . [The law] suppresses expression out of concern for its likely
communicative impact. . . . [I]ts restriction on expression cannot be
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”144

Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
O’Connor, dissented to argue that the law was reasonable and
content-neutral.145 They argued that, since people who destroy or deface
American flags have a diverse array of reasons for doing so, the government’s
interest in preserving the symbolic value of the flag was not related to the
suppression of any particular message.146 In other words, they argued that the
category of viewpoints that individuals may desire to express through the
destruction of the American flag is so diverse that it is not accurate to describe
a ban on such conduct as content- or viewpoint-based.
The Court provided further elaboration on content-neutrality principles in a
pair of cases reviewing state tax provisions. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,147 the Court held that a state tax
that was imposed on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in the

142

496 U.S. 310 (1990).
Id. at 319. The law was enacted in response to Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), in which the
Court held that a conviction for burning the American flag under a Texas law prohibiting the desecration of
venerated objects was unconstitutional. Id. at 314.
144 Id. at 315–18 (citations omitted) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)).
145 Id. at 319–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 320–22.
147 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
143
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production of a publication was unconstitutional.148 The first $100,000 worth
of ink and paper used by a publication in a year was exempt, which resulted in
roughly two-thirds of the revenue from the tax coming from one large
newspaper company.149 The Court held that the tax provision was “facially
discriminatory” by singling out the press,150 which “suggests that the goal of
the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and such a goal is
presumptively unconstitutional.”151 The Court further stated,
[The tax] violates the First Amendment not only because it singles
out the press, but also because it targets a small group of
newspapers. . . . [O]nly a handful of publishers pay any tax at all, and
even fewer pay any significant amount of tax. . . . Whatever the
motive of the legislature in this case, we think that recognizing a
power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor
the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such
a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can
justify the scheme. . . .
We need not and do not impugn the motives of the Minnesota
Legislature in passing the ink and paper tax. Illicit legislative intent is
not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment. . . . A tax
that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications
within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its
action.152

Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating, “The ‘differential treatment’ standard
that the Court has conjured up is unprecedented and unwarranted. To my
knowledge this Court has never subjected governmental action to the most
stringent constitutional review solely on the basis of ‘differential treatment’ of
particular groups.”153
Similarly, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,154 the Court held
that a state sales tax scheme under which general interest magazines were
taxed but newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals

148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 575, 593.
Id. at 578–79.
Id. at 581–82.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 591–93.
Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
481 U.S. 221 (1987).
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were exempt, violated the First Amendment.155 The Court held that the tax at
issue was content-based, explaining,
[T]he Arkansas sales tax cannot be characterized as
nondiscriminatory, because it is not evenly applied to all magazines.
To the contrary, the magazine exemption means that only a few
Arkansas magazines pay any sales tax . . . .
. . . [T]he basis on which Arkansas differentiates between
magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a
magazine’s tax status depends entirely on its content. . . .
. . . In order to determine whether a magazine is subject to sales
tax, Arkansas’ “enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the
content of the message that is conveyed . . . .” Such official scrutiny
of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is
entirely incompatible with the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of the press.156

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the grounds
that “tax exemptions, credits, and deductions are ‘a form of subsidy that is
administered through the tax system,’ and . . . ‘a legislature’s decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and
thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.’”157
Additionally, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Board,158 the Court held that a law requiring that any income
generated by an accused or convicted criminal’s works describing his crimes
be held in an escrow account to be made available to his victims and creditors
was content-based and did not survive strict scrutiny because it was
overbroad.159 The law was content-based because “[i]t single[d] out income
derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other
income, and it is directed only at works with a specified content.”160
The Court rejected the argument that the law should be viewed as
content-neutral since the government did not intend to suppress certain
155

Id. at 233.
Id. at 229–30 (citation omitted) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383
(1984)).
157 Id. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544,
549 (1983)).
158 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
159 Id. at 116, 123.
160 Id. at 116.
156
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viewpoints, repeating its statement from Minneapolis Star that “‘illicit
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First
Amendment.’”161 The Court also emphasized that “‘[t]he fact that society may
find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it
is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection.’”162
Justice Kennedy concurred to argue that content-based laws should be
categorically unconstitutional, without any need to apply strict scrutiny.163 He
stated,
Here, a law is directed to speech alone where the speech in
question is not obscene, not defamatory, not words tantamount to an
act otherwise criminal, not an impairment of some other
constitutional right, not an incitement to lawless action, and not
calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the State has the
substantive power to prevent. No further inquiry is necessary to reject
the State’s argument that the statute should be upheld.
Borrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailoring analysis is
ill advised when all that is at issue is a content-based restriction, for
resort to the test might be read as a concession that States may censor
speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for
doing so. Our precedents and traditions allow no such inference. . . .
....
. . . When we leave open the possibility that various sorts of
content regulations are appropriate, we discount the value of our
precedents and invite experiments that in fact present clear violations
of the First Amendment, as is true in the case before us.164

In addition, in Burson v. Freeman,165 the Court was in agreement that the
law at issue was content-based, but was fractured on the proper test to be
applied and also the outcome. A four-Justice plurality held that a law
prohibiting the display or distribution of campaign materials, or the solicitation

161

Id. at 117 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592
(1983)).
162 Id. at 118 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
163 Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 124–27.
165 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
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of votes, within 100 feet of the entrance of a polling place was content-based
but survived strict scrutiny.166 The plurality opinion stated that
[t]he Tennessee restriction under consideration . . . is not a facially
content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. Whether
individuals may exercise their free speech rights near polling places
depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political
campaign. The statute does not reach other categories of speech, such
as commercial solicitation, distribution, and display.167

Justice Kennedy concurred to take issue with the idea that “a State may
restrict speech based on its content in the pursuit of a compelling interest,” as
he believed that “neither a general content-based proscription of speech nor a
content-based proscription of speech in a public forum can be justified unless
the speech falls within one of a limited set of well-defined categories.”168 He
believed the law at issue was constitutional because “there is a narrow area in
which the First Amendment permits freedom of expression to yield to the
extent necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional right,” and
the law was enacted “to protect the integrity of the polling place where citizens
exercise the right to vote.”169
Justice Scalia concurred to state that, in light of the historical prevalence of
polling place restrictions of this nature, the law should be viewed as a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a non-public forum.170 Three
Justices dissented to argue that the law could not survive strict scrutiny.171
Furthermore, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,172 the Court
held that a ban on the distribution of commercial publications through
newsracks located on public property was unconstitutional.173 The government
argued that the ban was content-neutral because it was enacted for legitimate
reasons unrelated to any desire to censor particular viewpoints.174 The Court
stated:

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 211.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 211–12 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 214–16 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
507 U.S. 410 (1993).
Id. at 412.
Id. at 428–29.
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The argument is unpersuasive because the very basis for the
regulation is the difference in content between ordinary newspapers
and commercial speech. True, there is no evidence that the city has
acted with animus toward the ideas contained within respondents’
publications, but . . . . [r]egardless of the mens rea of the city, it has
enacted a sweeping ban on the use of newsracks that distribute
“commercial handbills,” but not “newspapers.” Under the city’s
newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban
is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that
newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the
ban in this case is “content based.”175

The Court reached further consensus in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District.176 In Lamb’s Chapel, the Court unanimously held
that a public school policy that allowed school property to be used by private
groups for social, civic, or recreational purposes, while forbidding use for
religious purposes, was viewpoint-discriminatory and unconstitutional.177 The
Court framed the issue as whether the school district engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by “permit[ting] school property to be used for the presentation
of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the
subject matter from a religious standpoint.”178 The Court held that the fact that
all religious viewpoints were treated the same (by being excluded) did not
make the rule viewpoint-neutral, as the school treated non-religious viewpoints
more favorably than religious viewpoints.179
Additionally, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,180 the Court held that a
Vermont law restricting the sale and use of pharmacy records in order to limit
certain marketing practices was content-based and unconstitutional.181 The
Court stated,

175 Id. at 429. The Court added that “there are no secondary effects attributable to respondent publishers’
newsracks that distinguish them from the newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on its sidewalks.” Id. at 430.
176 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
177 Id. at 392–97.
178 Id. at 393.
179 Id. at 393–94; cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When
the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of
the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content
discrimination.” (citation omitted)). In some respects, Lamb’s Chapel is analogous to Mosley; both cases
involved provisions that, on their face, expressly treated speakers differently on the basis of content or
viewpoint, and in both cases the Court’s treatment of such laws as highly suspect was unanimous.
180 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
181 Id. at 2659.
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On its face, Vermont’s law enacts content- and speaker-based
restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying
information. . . . The law on its face burdens disfavored speech by
disfavored speakers. . . .
....
. . . Just as the “inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render
it unconstitutional,” a statute’s stated purposes may also be
considered. . . . The legislature designed [the law] to target those
speakers and their messages for disfavored treatment. . . .
....
. . . A government bent on frustrating an impending demonstration
might pass a law demanding two years’ notice before the issuance of
parade permits. Even if the hypothetical measure on its face appeared
neutral as to content and speaker, its purpose to suppress speech and
its unjustified burdens on expression would render it
unconstitutional.182

Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, argued
that strict scrutiny was improper because the impact on expression was
“inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial
enterprise,” and “[r]egulatory programs necessarily draw distinctions on the
basis of content.”183
In sum, the Court’s content- and viewpoint-neutrality jurisprudence
continues to perplex judges and litigators alike who try to reconcile conflicting
rationales and holdings spanning the past several decades. The following Part
offers a suggestion as to how the Court can clarify the applicable standards
and, in the process, restore a more robust protection for free expression.
II. A MORE SPEECH-PROTECTIVE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY TEST IS NEEDED
The fractured nature of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area is due, in part,
to sharply different views of the proper scope of the Free Speech Clause held
by distinct groups of Justices. For example, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas have generally expressed a more robust speech-protective view of the
First Amendment. For example, their vote to strike down the law in R.A.V. was
premised on the view that the government cannot regulate a subset of speech,
182
183

Id. at 2663–64 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2673, 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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whether “unprotected” or otherwise, “solely on the basis of the subjects the
speech addresses.”184 They also dissented or concurred in Madsen, Hill, and
McCullen to critique the majority opinions for misreading Ward and for failing
to provide sufficiently broad protection for free speech. In many respects, this
group has raised concerns similar to those previously expressed by Justices
Marshall and Brennan, who believed that some of the Court’s decisions failed
to give sufficient protection to the exercise of the freedom of speech.
Conversely, Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan
have often voiced an opposing view in favor of standards that are less
favorable to speakers in various cases. Those who were on the Court at the
time concurred in R.A.V. (joined by Justice White) to critique the majority
opinion as too speaker-friendly, and they joined the majority decisions in
Madsen, Hill, and McCullen, which set forth narrower conceptions of free
speech than the view of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. In both Sorrell
and Reed, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan argued against the
applicability of strict scrutiny when six other Justices held that it was
appropriate.
The view of the Free Speech Clause espoused by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas in the content- and viewpoint-neutrality cases, reflective in many
aspects of the previously expressed views of Justices Marshall and Brennan,
should be expressly adopted by the Court, as it is more consistent with the
Court’s broader jurisprudence concerning fundamental rights and also averts
the tangible dangers to free expression caused by the position that legislative
purpose is the controlling consideration. The Court’s predominant focus on
facial discrimination and government motive, to the exclusion of other
important factors, leaves government actors with far too free a hand to hamper
the effectiveness of speakers while evading strict scrutiny.
There are five (somewhat overlapping) kinds of situations in which the
Court should treat a law as being content-based, viewpoint-based, or both, and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny:
1. The government’s actual purpose is to suppress speech based on its content
or viewpoint, or to impose subjective editorial control over content or
viewpoint.

184

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
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It is an uncontroversial, bedrock principle of First Amendment
jurisprudence that the government cannot intentionally target speakers due to
disagreement with the content or viewpoint of their expression.185
2. The government interest that the law is intended to further relates to an
aspect of the direct or emotive communicative impact of regulated
expression, rather than the manner of its delivery.
There is broad support for the principle that this category of laws should be
treated as content- or viewpoint-based—see O’Brien, Boos, R.A.V., Eichman,
Justice O’Connor’s separate opinion in Turner Broadcasting, Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Hill, and McCullen186—but there is often disagreement over whether
a particular government interest does, in fact, target communicative impact as
opposed to the manner of delivery. What happens when a speaker’s manner of
delivery is intended to, and actually does, make up a significant component of
the communicative impact that the speaker seeks to achieve? In many cases,
laws that truly target communicative impact will fall into one or more of the
other suspect categories mentioned herein, whereas laws that truly target the
manner of delivery will not.
3. The law, on its face, treats speakers differently due to the content or
viewpoint of their message, or excludes from its coverage speech or
conduct relating to different subject matter or viewpoints that pose similar
threats to the government’s asserted interests.
Although there has traditionally been strong support for the principle that
facially discriminatory laws should be subject to strict scrutiny—see Mosley,
Regan, Minneapolis Star, Arkansas Writers’ Project, Justice Brennan’s dissent
in Renton, Simon & Schuster, Discovery Network, the plurality opinion in
Burson, the majority and Justice O’Connor opinions in Turner Broadcasting,
Lamb’s Chapel, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Madsen, Justices Scalia and
Kennedy’s dissents in Hill, Sorrell, Justices Scalia and Alito’s concurrences in
McCullen, and Reed187—the Court has not always categorized laws that
185 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518
(2014); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989);
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
186 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518; Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622;
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Eichman, 496 U.S. 310; Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988);
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
187 Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218; McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518; Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653; Hill, 530 U.S. 703;
Madsen, 512 U.S. 753; Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622; Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
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actually differentiate among speakers based on the content of their message as
content-based. Additionally, separate opinions in Sorrell and Reed implied that
not all laws that differentiate among speakers based on content should
necessarily be subject to strict scrutiny.188
The Court should continue to subject laws of this nature to strict scrutiny; it
should be an exceedingly rare case in which the government is allowed to treat
speakers differently due to the content or viewpoint of their expression.
Additionally, laws that burden certain types of speakers while leaving other
types of speakers who impact the government’s asserted interests in a similar
manner untouched would rarely survive review regardless of what standard is
applied, so categorically subjecting them to strict scrutiny would bring
doctrinal clarity without causing widespread change in practice.
4. The actual or inevitable effect of the law is to prevent speakers espousing
certain messages from effectively reaching their intended audience, such as
by targeting a particular location or manner of expression that is closely tied
to one subject matter or viewpoint.
Support for treating this category of laws as content- or viewpoint-based
can be found in the majority and Harlan concurring opinions in O’Brien, the
Marshall dissent in Clark, Minneapolis Star, Arkansas Writers’ Project, the
Brennan dissent in Renton, R.A.V., Eichman, the Brennan concurrence in Boos,
the Scalia concurrence in Madsen, the Scalia and Kennedy dissents in Hill,
Sorrell, and the Scalia and Alito concurrences in McCullen.189 As discussed
previously, several of these opinions explain, in detail, why laws that
disproportionately and significantly burden one discrete group of speakers are
highly suspect and should be treated as such.
A law’s actual impact usually reflects, or at least strongly relates to, the
government’s intended purposes; as Justice Kennedy noted in Hill, “The

School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993);
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); City of Renton, 475
U.S. 41; Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Rev.,
460 U.S. 575 (1983); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
188 Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218; Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653.
189 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518; Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653; Hill, 530 U.S. 703; Madsen, 512 U.S. 753;
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377; Eichman, 496 U.S. 310; Boos, 485 U.S. 312; Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc., 481 U.S. 221;
City of Renton, 475 U.S. 41; Clark, 468 U.S. 288; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. 575; O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367.
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statute’s operation reflects its objective.”190 In addition, it would be anomalous
and indefensible if it were the case that the primary effect of government
action may render it unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause despite a
legitimate government purpose,191 but may not subject it to strict scrutiny
under the Free Speech Clause no matter how devastating the impact is upon
those seeking to discuss one particular subject matter or espouse one particular
viewpoint.
5. The law lends itself to use for content- or viewpoint-discriminatory
purposes, or there is a realistic possibility that official suppression is afoot.
Support for treating this category of laws as content- or viewpoint-based
can be found in the Brennan dissent in Taxpayers for Vincent, R.A.V., the
Scalia concurrence in Madsen, the Scalia and Alito concurrences in McCullen,
and Reed.192 Laws that lend themselves to use for content- or viewpointdiscriminatory purposes pose the same type of threat to the exercise of free
speech as laws that give government officials unfettered or unduly broad
discretion; both are suspect not because they will always be used for nefarious
purposes, but rather that they can easily be so used.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to justify excluding any of the five categories of laws
identified herein from strict scrutiny review, and subjecting them to strict
scrutiny would bring a broader degree of consistency to the Court’s
jurisprudence. For each of these categories, numerous majority or separate
opinions outline the dangers posed by laws of this nature, making them
inherently suspect. Conversely, the more narrow view of the Free Speech
Clause set forth in various opinions gives insufficient protection for the
freedom of speech. The Court should expressly refine the content-neutrality
test to include all of the above-discussed categories of laws.
The proposed test for determining whether a law is content- or
viewpoint-based set forth in this Article would help to ensure that freedom of
speech receives the robust protection that it deserves. It would minimize the
need of courts and litigators alike to attempt to divine the government’s actual
190

Hill, 530 U.S. at 768–69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
192 Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218; McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518; Madsen, 512 U.S. 753; R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377;
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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motives behind a speech regulation. This approach would also encourage the
government to pursue available regulatory measures that steer clear of
burdening expression whenever possible.

